激勵(lì)理論

前言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.　　……

內(nèi)容概要

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

作者簡介

作者:(美)拉奉特

書籍目錄

ForewordIntroductionl  Incentives in Economic Thought  1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture  1.2 Chester Barlmrd and Incentives in Management  1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: Tile Free-Rider Problem  1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting  1.5 Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies  1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance  1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives  1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination  1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies  1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design  1.11 Auctions2  The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off  2.1 The Basic Model  2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract  2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts  2.4 Information Rents  2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal  2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off  2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information  2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing  2.9 Tile Revelation Principle  2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent  2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints  2.12 Commitment  2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms,  2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting,  2.15 Contract Theory at Work  Appendix3  Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection  3.1 More than Two Types  3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information  3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing IncentiTces  3.4 Random Participation Constraint  3,5 Limited Liability  3,6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification  3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off  Appendices4  Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs  4.1 Tile Model  4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best hnplementation  4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency  4.4 Tile Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency  4.5 More than Two Levels of Performance  4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting  4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Finn  4.8 Contract Theory at Work  4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard.  Appendices5  Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard.  5.1 More than Two Levels of Effort  5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem  5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function  5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard Appendices6  Nonverifiability  6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining  6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract  6.3 Nash Implementation  6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation  6.5 Risk Aversion  6.6 Concluding Remarks7  Mixed Models  7.1 Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard  7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection  7.3 Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability8  Dynamics under Full Commitment  8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection  b.2 Repeated Moral Hazard  8.3 Constraints on Transfers: The Role of hnplicit Incentives9  Limits and Extensions  9.1 Informed Principal.  9.2 Limits to Enforcement  9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment  9.4 The Hold-Up Problem  9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts  9.6 Limits in the Action Space  9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior  9.8 Endogenous Information StructuresReferencesAuthor IndexSubject Index

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　　《激勵(lì)理論：委托代理模型》是著名微觀理論經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家拉奉特以及其學(xué)生martimort的合寫的理論著作，其影響力可想而知。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和激勵(lì)的關(guān)系密切，如激勵(lì)努力工作、激勵(lì)高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品、激勵(lì)努力學(xué)習(xí)、激勵(lì)投資和激勵(lì)儲(chǔ)蓄。盡管adam smith兩百多年前在他的佃農(nóng)合同分析中充分肯定了這一點(diǎn)，但只有在近些年這個(gè)理論在經(jīng)濟(jì)思想中才占據(jù)了核心地位。本書中，jean-jacques laffont 和david martimort對(duì)激勵(lì)理論的表述是目前最透徹的和最容易學(xué)習(xí)的。本理論的核心是對(duì)現(xiàn)代管理就如同對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)理論一樣至關(guān)重要的簡單問題：是什么讓人們?cè)谝粋€(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)和商業(yè)環(huán)境中會(huì)有特殊的表現(xiàn)？為了尋找答案，書中給出了特定的環(huán)境下能夠確保對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)的良好激勵(lì)的方法論工具。    讀者對(duì)象：數(shù)學(xué)、經(jīng)濟(jì)相關(guān)專業(yè)的本科生、研究生和相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域的從業(yè)人員。

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