道德情操論

出版時(shí)間:2008-10  出版社:清華大學(xué)出版社  作者:亞當(dāng)·斯密  頁(yè)數(shù):482  譯者:王勛,紀(jì)飛 等 編譯  
Tag標(biāo)簽:無(wú)  

前言

  亞當(dāng)·斯密(Adam Smith,1723-1790),英國(guó)著名古典政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、哲學(xué)家,現(xiàn)代西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)之父。1723年6月5日,亞當(dāng)·斯密出生于蘇格蘭,青年時(shí)就讀于牛津大學(xué);1748-1751年,任愛(ài)丁堡大學(xué)講師,講授經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué);1751-1764年,任格拉斯哥大學(xué)哲學(xué)教授,1759年出版了他的首部巨著《道德情操論》(The 7heory of Moral Sentiments),該書(shū)締造了以“公民的幸福生活”為目標(biāo)的倫理思想體系,從而確立了他在學(xué)術(shù)界的地位和威望。1776年,出版了市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)巨著《國(guó)富論

內(nèi)容概要

  The Theory of Moral Sentiments,中文譯名為《道德情操論》,它由英國(guó)著名古典政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、現(xiàn)代西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)之父、哲學(xué)家亞當(dāng)·斯密編著。這是一部劃時(shí)代的巨著,是古典經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的哲學(xué)基礎(chǔ)。全書(shū)共有七卷,主要闡釋道德情感的本質(zhì)和道德評(píng)價(jià)的性質(zhì)。書(shū)中列舉了支配人類(lèi)行為的各種動(dòng)機(jī),包括自愛(ài)、同情心、追求自由的欲望、正義感、勞動(dòng)習(xí)慣和交換傾向等,認(rèn)為一個(gè)人的同情心與思維構(gòu)造是形成其獨(dú)特的道德情操、道德判斷及美德的基礎(chǔ);闡述了人本性中所有的同情的情感是形成其道德取向的基礎(chǔ),是人類(lèi)正義感和其他一切道德情感的形成根源,由此說(shuō)明道德評(píng)價(jià)的性質(zhì),以此為基礎(chǔ)表明各種基本美德的特征,并向世人強(qiáng)調(diào):道德和正義對(duì)于社會(huì)乃至市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的運(yùn)行是非常重要的。    無(wú)論是作為哲學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等專(zhuān)業(yè)的經(jīng)典讀本,還是作為語(yǔ)言學(xué)習(xí)的課外讀物,本書(shū)對(duì)當(dāng)代中國(guó)讀者,特別是對(duì)哲學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等相關(guān)專(zhuān)業(yè)學(xué)習(xí)的大學(xué)生和從事研究工作的學(xué)者都將產(chǎn)生積極的影響。為了使讀者能夠了解每個(gè)論述主題的主要內(nèi)容,進(jìn)而提高閱讀速度和閱讀水平,在每個(gè)主題的開(kāi)始部分增加了中文導(dǎo)讀。

作者簡(jiǎn)介

  亞當(dāng)·斯密(Adam Smith,1723-1790),英國(guó)著名古典政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、哲學(xué)家、現(xiàn)代西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)之父。亞當(dāng)·斯密1723年6月5日出生于蘇格蘭,青年時(shí)就讀于牛津大學(xué)國(guó); 1748-1751,任愛(ài)丁堡大學(xué)講師,講授經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué);1751-1764年,任格拉斯哥大學(xué)哲學(xué)教授,1759年出版了他的首部巨著《道德情操論》(The Theory of Moral Sentiments)。該書(shū)締造了以“公民的幸福生活”為目標(biāo)的倫理思想體系,從而確立了亞當(dāng)·斯密在學(xué)術(shù)界的地位和威望。

書(shū)籍目錄

  第一卷 論行為的適宜性  Part One Of the Propriety of Action  第一篇 論適宜性  SectionⅠ Of the Sense of Propriety   第一章 論同情  Chapter 1 Of Sympathy   第二章 論相互同情的快樂(lè)  Chapter 2 Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy   第三章 論比較他人的感情與我們的感情是否一致來(lái)判斷他人感情是否適宜的方式  Chapter 3 Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their concord or dissonance with our own   第四章 續(xù)前章  Chapter 4 The same subject continued   第五章 論親切的和值得尊敬的美德  Chapter 5 Of the amiable and respectable virtues   第二篇 論各種適宜的激情程度  Section Ⅱ Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety   引言  Introduction   第一章 論源于身體的激情  Chapter 1 Of the Passions which take their origin from the body   第二章 論源于某種特殊傾向或想象習(xí)慣的激情  Chapter 2 Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination   第三章 論不友好的激情  Chapter 3 Of the unsocial Passions   第四章 論友好的激情  Chapter 4 Of the social Passions   第五章 論自私的激情  Chapter 5 Of the selfish Passions   第三篇 論繁榮和災(zāi)禍對(duì)人們判斷行為是否適宜所產(chǎn)生的影響;以及為什么在一種情形下比在另一種情況下更容易獲得人們的認(rèn)可  Section Ⅲ Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than in the other   第一章 雖然我們對(duì)悲傷的同情一般比對(duì)快樂(lè)的同情更為強(qiáng)烈,但是它通常遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有主要當(dāng)事人自然感受到的強(qiáng)烈  Chapter 1 That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned   第二章 論野心的起源和社會(huì)階層的區(qū)別  Chapter 2 Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks   第三章 論源于欽佩富人和大人物、輕視或忽視窮人和小人物的道德情操敗壞  Chapter 3 Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition     第二卷 論優(yōu)、缺點(diǎn);報(bào)答與懲處的對(duì)象  Part Two Of Merit and Demerit; or of the Objects of Reward and Punishment  第一篇 論對(duì)優(yōu)點(diǎn)和缺點(diǎn)的感覺(jué)  Section Ⅰ Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit   引言  Introduction   第一章 任何適宜的感激對(duì)象的行為顯然應(yīng)該得到報(bào)答;同樣,任何適宜的憤恨對(duì)象的行為顯然應(yīng)該受到懲罰   Chapter 1 That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment   第二章 論適當(dāng)?shù)母屑?duì)象和適當(dāng)?shù)膽嵑迣?duì)象  Chapter 2 Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment   第三章 不認(rèn)可施恩者的行為,就幾乎不會(huì)同情受益者的感激;相反,對(duì)損人者的動(dòng)機(jī)表示認(rèn)同,對(duì)受難者的憤恨就不會(huì)有一點(diǎn)同情  Chapter 3 That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it   第四章 對(duì)前幾章的概括  Chapter 4 Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters   第五章 對(duì)優(yōu)點(diǎn)和缺點(diǎn)感覺(jué)的分析  Chapter 5 The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit   第二篇 論正義和仁慈  Section two Of Justice and Beneficence   第一章 兩種美德的比較  Chapter 1 Comparison of those two virtues   第二章 論對(duì)正義、懊悔的感覺(jué),兼論對(duì)優(yōu)點(diǎn)的意識(shí)  Chapter 2 Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit   第三章 論這種天性構(gòu)成的效用  Chapter 3 Of the utility of this constitution of Nature   第三篇 關(guān)于行為的優(yōu)點(diǎn)或缺點(diǎn),論命運(yùn)對(duì)人類(lèi)情感的影響  Section Ⅲ Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions   引言  Introduction   第一章 論這種命運(yùn)產(chǎn)生影響的原因  Chapter 1 Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune   第二章 論這種命運(yùn)產(chǎn)生影響的程度  Chapter 2 Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune   第三章 論這種無(wú)規(guī)律情感變化的最終原因  Chapter 3 Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments     第三卷 論評(píng)判自己的情感和行為的基礎(chǔ),兼論責(zé)任感  Part Three Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty  第一章 論自我認(rèn)同和不認(rèn)同的原則  Chapter 1 Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation   第二章 論對(duì)贊揚(yáng)和值得贊揚(yáng)的喜歡;兼論對(duì)責(zé)備和該受責(zé)備的恐懼  Chapter 2 Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness   第三章 論良心的威信和影響  Chapter 3 Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience   第四章 論自欺欺人的本性,兼論一般準(zhǔn)則的起源和用途  Chapter 4 Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the origin and Use of general Rules   第五章 論道德的通常規(guī)則的影響和威信,以及它們被公正地看作神的法則  Chapter 5 Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity   第六章 在何種情況下,責(zé)任感應(yīng)該成為人們行為的唯一準(zhǔn)則;在何種情況下,它應(yīng)該同其他動(dòng)機(jī)一起發(fā)生作用  Chapter 6 In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives     第四卷 論效用對(duì)認(rèn)同情感的作用  Part Four Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation  第一章 論效用的表現(xiàn)賦予所有藝術(shù)作品的美,兼論這種美所具有的廣泛影響   Chapter 1 Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of Art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty   第二章 論效用的表現(xiàn)賦予人的行為和品格的美,以及關(guān)于這種美的概念可能在何種程度上被看成一種原始的認(rèn)同原則   Chapter 2 Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation     第五卷 習(xí)慣和風(fēng)氣對(duì)認(rèn)同的與不認(rèn)同的道德情操的影響  Part Five Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation  第一章 論習(xí)慣和風(fēng)氣施加于人們對(duì)美和丑看法的影響  Chapter 1 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our notions of Beauty and Deformity   第二章 論習(xí)慣和風(fēng)氣對(duì)道德情感的影響  Chapter 2 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments     第六卷 論美德的品格  Part Six Of the Character of Virtue  引言  Introduction   第一篇 論個(gè)人的品格,就它對(duì)其幸福的影響而言;或論謹(jǐn)慎  SECTION Ⅰ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it   affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence   第二篇 論個(gè)人的品格,就它對(duì)其他人幸福的影響  SECTION Ⅱ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People   引言  Introduction   第一章 論天性致使個(gè)人成為我們關(guān)心和注意的對(duì)象所依據(jù)的次序  Chapter 1 Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention   第二章 論天性使社會(huì)團(tuán)體成為人們行善對(duì)象的次序  Chapter 2 Of the Order in which societies are by Nature recommended to our Beneficence   第三章 論世界性的行善  Chapter 3 Of universal Benevolence   第三篇 論自我支配  SECTION Ⅲ Of Self-command   第六卷的結(jié)論  Conclusion of the Sixth Part   第七卷 論道德的哲學(xué)體系  Part Seven Of Systems of Moral Philosophy  第一篇 論應(yīng)當(dāng)在道德情感理論中考慮的問(wèn)題  SECTION Ⅰ Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments   第二篇 論已對(duì)美德的本質(zhì)做出的各種說(shuō)明  SECTION Ⅱ Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue   引言  Introduction   第一章 論認(rèn)為美德存在于適宜性之中的那些體系  Chapter 1 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety   第二章 論認(rèn)為美德存在于謹(jǐn)慎之中的那些體系  Chapter 2 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence   第三章 論認(rèn)為美德存在于善行之中的那些體系  Chapter 3 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence   第四章 論放肆的體系  Chapter 4 Of licentious Systems   第三篇 論已經(jīng)形成的有關(guān)認(rèn)同原則的各種體系  SECTION Ⅲ Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation   引言  Introduction   第一章 論從自愛(ài)推斷出認(rèn)同原則的那些體系  Chapter 1 Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from self-love   第二章 論把理性看成認(rèn)同原則的根源的那些體系  Chapter 2 Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation   第三章 論把情感看成認(rèn)同原則的根源的那些體系  Chapter 3 Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation   第四篇 論不同的作者論述道德實(shí)踐規(guī)則的方式  SECTION Ⅳ Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality

章節(jié)摘錄

  第一卷 論行為的適宜性  Part One Of the Propriety of Action  第一篇 論適宜性  SectionⅠ Of the Sense of Propriety  第一章論同情  Chapter 1 Of Sympathy  人天生存在憐憫或同情的本性,這種情感是人人都有的,只是可能因品行的高低差異而感受到的強(qiáng)弱不同。對(duì)于別人的感受我們只能通過(guò)想象獲知,我們所體會(huì)的痛苦或悲傷并不是他人實(shí)際的感覺(jué),這些自我感覺(jué)在一定程度上與我們的想象力成比例。大量事實(shí)表明,我們會(huì)對(duì)受難者的感受和動(dòng)作具有類(lèi)似的感受并做出相似的動(dòng)作?! 】梢詫ⅰ巴椤崩斫鉃椤皯z憫”或“體恤”,但是它同樣可以用來(lái)表示對(duì)任何一種激情的同感。同情有時(shí)候來(lái)自對(duì)一些人情緒的觀察,有時(shí)候在真正了解情況之前,激情已引起了我們的厭惡和反感。激情也會(huì)由于其表現(xiàn)性質(zhì)不同而產(chǎn)生不同的影響。悲傷或高興只能影響感受到同樣情緒的人,而有關(guān)命運(yùn)的想法卻引起一般人的關(guān)切,因此將同情理解為看到激發(fā)這種激情的境況而產(chǎn)生的,似乎好過(guò)于理解為看到對(duì)方的激情而產(chǎn)生的。如母親擔(dān)心嬰兒,人們同情死者一樣,是由于內(nèi)心的害怕和恐懼,使得痛苦的滋長(zhǎng)無(wú)法控制?!?/pre>

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  《道德情操論》(中文導(dǎo)讀英文版)無(wú)論是作為哲學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等專(zhuān)業(yè)的經(jīng)典讀本,還是作為語(yǔ)言學(xué)習(xí)的課外讀物,《道德情操論》對(duì)當(dāng)代中國(guó)讀者,特別是對(duì)哲學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等相關(guān)專(zhuān)業(yè)學(xué)習(xí)的大學(xué)生和從事研究工作的學(xué)者都將產(chǎn)生積極的影響。為了使讀者能夠了解每個(gè)論述主題的主要內(nèi)容,進(jìn)而提高閱讀速度和閱讀水平,在每個(gè)主題的開(kāi)始部分增加了中文導(dǎo)讀。

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