《功利主義》既然陷入爭議,那么審視其姊妹篇《論自由(On liberty,1859)》時也該格外小心?!墩撟杂伞分辽儆腥齻€值得關(guān)注之處:第1、一開篇密爾就撇棄了“意志自由”問題而僅限于關(guān)注“公民自由或社會自由,也就是社會所能合法施加于個人的權(quán)力的性質(zhì)和限度”【《論自由》,1】問題。這一撇棄委實具有重大意義,意味著撇棄形而上學(xué)而僅僅依賴經(jīng)驗或常識理性來理解人及其政治,——甚至意味著丟棄形而上學(xué)沉思的傳統(tǒng)。丟棄了自由意志,丟棄了笛卡爾開創(chuàng)的形而上學(xué)反思的自我,哪怕密爾不停地呼吁要捍衛(wèi)個體性(individuality),我們也總會茫然若失:丟失了形而上學(xué)和詩意之維的個體太容易湮滅在茫茫人海中。密爾繼承了典型的英國經(jīng)驗理性的思想和寫作風(fēng)格,充滿現(xiàn)實的智睿和洞見,但形而上學(xué)和體系自洽性則顯然有所欠缺,讓人不禁回憶起黑格爾在《哲學(xué)史講演錄:第四卷》中所言:“英國人在歐洲似乎是一個局限于現(xiàn)實理智的民族,就像國內(nèi)小商販和手工業(yè)者階層那樣,注定老是沉溺在物質(zhì)生活之中,以現(xiàn)實為對象,卻不以理性為對象。”【19-20】 第2、密爾雖然宣稱自己“把功利視為一切倫理問題上的最終歸宿”【《論自由》,11】,但在《論自由》中很難說他真的謹(jǐn)守了這一基本原則:第二章中密爾主要訴諸真理價值來辯護思想言論自由(真理只能在很邊緣的含義上是一種效用),第三章則部分地訴諸個性發(fā)展(development of individuality)的一種有機論的、自然主義的人性觀、部分訴諸類似于康德的自律的人性理解來辯護行為自由。密爾只是在確立個體自由和社會控制的邊界時明確應(yīng)用了狹義的效用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。第3、雖然密爾確立了自由主義的基本原理(個人只要在不傷害他人的范圍內(nèi),就應(yīng)該擁有完全的思想自由、言論自由和個性自由(行動自由)),但其主要的憂慮或關(guān)切點卻不是憲政制度的確立,這里密爾基本上預(yù)設(shè)了選舉的責(zé)任制政府下權(quán)力與人民的一致性;像托克維爾一樣,密爾的憂慮主要是平庸大眾和多數(shù)人的暴政即所謂的社會對個體的暴政。
閱讀使用的是廣西師大孟凡禮譯本《論自由》,這似是迄今很好的中譯本,相當(dāng)精致;英文對參The Pennsylvania State University 1998年版?!?br />
“獻辭”中密爾表達了對其妻Harriet Taylor Mill(1807-1858)的懷念和推重,情真意切,感人至深。
“章1: 引論(introductory)”
開篇密爾就宣稱自己討論的“不是所謂的意志自由(即那個與被誤稱為‘哲學(xué)必然性’的信條不巧恰相對立的東西),而是公民自由或社會自由,也就是社會所能合法施加于個人的權(quán)力的性質(zhì)和限度(is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the mis-named doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual)?!薄灸吕眨骸墩撟杂伞?,孟凡禮譯,廣西師范大學(xué)出版社2011年版,頁1,下同】密爾認(rèn)為這會是將來的樞紐問題(vital question)。密爾回顧說,早期,人們并不質(zhì)疑統(tǒng)治者的至上權(quán)威,自由僅僅指“對暴政的防范(protection against the tyranny)”,這有兩種方式:1、確立某些被稱為政治自由或政治權(quán)利的豁免權(quán);2.較為晚近的憲政制衡(constitutional check),使得統(tǒng)治權(quán)力的實施以得到共同體的同意為必要條件。
密爾隨后說,隨著平民政府(popular government)時代的來臨和民選的責(zé)任政府(elective and responsible government)的建立,政府被看做人們的代理人(delegate),政府的利益與人民的利益被認(rèn)為一致,限制統(tǒng)治者權(quán)力的問題不再被認(rèn)為是最核心的。但是實踐表明 “行使權(quán)力的‘人民’和權(quán)力所施對象的人民并不總是同一的”【4】,自治政府(self-government)會遭遇多數(shù)者暴政(the tyranny of the majority)的問題。而且這一暴政不僅僅限于公共權(quán)力,而且延伸到更深遠的社會,即“優(yōu)勢意見和大眾情感的暴政”,而這“甚至束縛了人們的心靈本身?!薄?】
?。榱讼拗粕鐣谋┱U蟼€體),必須厘清社會對個人獨立的合法干預(yù)的限度。這就是個人獨立與社會控制的界限問題。界限設(shè)定在哪兒或合法的社會控制的基本準(zhǔn)則是什么?過往一直依賴習(xí)俗和傳統(tǒng)(譬如上流社會的習(xí)俗)來確立這一界限,卻缺乏原則性的觀念?!墩撟杂伞返哪康木褪菫榱舜_立一條簡明的原則來確定正當(dāng)社會干預(yù)的限度,“該原則就是,人們?nèi)粢缮嫒后w中任何個體的行動自由,無論干涉出自個人還是出自集體,其唯一正當(dāng)?shù)哪康哪耸潜U献晕也皇軅?。反過來說,違背其意志而不失正當(dāng)?shù)厥┲谖拿魃鐣魏纬蓡T的權(quán)力,唯一的目的也僅僅是防止其傷害他人。他本人的利益,不論是身體的還是精神的,都不能成為對他施以強制的充分理由?!魏稳说男袨?,只有涉及他人的哪一部分才必須要對社會負(fù)責(zé)。在僅僅關(guān)涉他自己的那一部分,他的獨立性照理說來就是絕對的。對于他自己,對于其身體和心靈,個人就是最高主權(quán)者(Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign)?!薄?0】在社會僅有間接的利害關(guān)系的領(lǐng)域,是個人自由的適當(dāng)領(lǐng)域,這包括如下方面:“首先是人類內(nèi)在的意識領(lǐng)域的自由:它要求最廣義的良心自由、思想和情感自由,對舉凡實踐、思想、科學(xué)、道德、宗教等所有事物的意見和態(tài)度的絕對自由。發(fā)表和出版意見的自由…幾乎同等重要,并且所依據(jù)的理由又大都相同,所以實際上是無法將它們分開的。第二,這一原則要求品味和志趣自由;自由地根據(jù)自己的特性規(guī)劃生活,做自己喜歡做的事并愿意承受一切可能的后果;…第三,由個人自由可以推出在同樣限制內(nèi)的個人聯(lián)合的自由(It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions…being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow;… Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals)?!薄?3】密爾的這一自由原理,也可以表述為:“唯一名副其實的自由,是以我們自己的方式追求我們自身之善的自由,只要我們沒有企圖剝奪別人的這種自由,也不去阻止他們追求自由的努力?!薄?3】由于當(dāng)前輿論和實踐是社會權(quán)力和控制的增強,密爾寄望這一自由原理“在人們的道德信念方面樹立起一道有力的屏障,來阻止這一危害?!薄?5】
第一種情況是不能確定要禁絕的意見是錯誤的。壓制表達自由的一個理由是為了防止謬種流傳并保證現(xiàn)世生活的安穩(wěn),但密爾認(rèn)為,“任何禁止自由討論都是認(rèn)定了自己絕對無誤(All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility)。”【18】“對我們所持的意見,給予反駁與質(zhì)難的完全自由,是我們有理由為了行動的目的而認(rèn)定它正確的先決條件,而且除此以外,在人類智能所及的范圍內(nèi),沒有任何東西能夠作為正確性的理性保證?!薄?1】保持言路開放以期發(fā)現(xiàn)真理并以正刊誤,“是作為常犯錯誤的人類所能獲得的確定性的全部,并且是我們能獲致確定性的唯一途徑。”【23】密爾以為,人們對于意見的確信常常不過是“缺乏信仰卻又懼怕懷疑(destitute of faith, but terrified at skepticism)”的一種表現(xiàn),無關(guān)真理,僅僅關(guān)涉所謂的社會效用。在反駁時,除了說明真理也是一種效用【25】,密爾舉了些例子證實妄言無誤(assumption of infallibility)導(dǎo)致危害: 蘇格拉底之死;耶穌之被釘十字架;Marcus Aurelius之迫害基督教。敵視信仰自由和表達自由的一個理由是:“迫害是真理應(yīng)該經(jīng)受而且總是能成功通過的考驗,法律的懲罰終將無力反對真理?!薄?0】密爾說這是一個美麗的謊言,“真理被迫害撲滅的例子史不絕書?!薄?1】而且這樣對待嘉惠人類的恩主也不仁厚公道。而且壓制和不寬容只造成表面的太平,卻導(dǎo)致“人類心靈中道德勇氣的全部犧牲。…受到最嚴(yán)重?fù)p害的并不是異端的心靈,而恰恰是那些并非異端的人,他們整個精神發(fā)展受到了限制,他們的理性被對異端的恐懼嚇壞了?!薄?6】
“章3: 論作為幸福因素之一的個性自由(on individuality, as one of the elements of well-being)”
本章辯護“人類應(yīng)該按照自己的意見自由行動——即只要他們愿意自負(fù)責(zé)任和自擔(dān)風(fēng)險,就應(yīng)該不受同胞實質(zhì)性的或道德的阻擾,而將其意見貫徹到自己的生活之中(that men should be free to act upon their opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril)。”【65】支持意見自由的那些理由也同樣支持行動自由。“各種性格只要不傷及他人就該允許其自由發(fā)展的空間。…總之,在并非首先關(guān)及他人的事情上,個性就應(yīng)該得到伸張。如果行為法則不是出于個人的性格,而是出于他人的傳統(tǒng)或習(xí)俗,人類幸福就缺少了其首要因素之一種?!薄?6】
密爾說,困難在于人們不關(guān)心個性自由(the development of individuality)這一目標(biāo),相反會傾向于認(rèn)為個性舒展會徒生滋擾。密爾援引了洪堡(Humboldt)支持自由和個性的論點:人的真正目的就是能力的充分而協(xié)調(diào)的發(fā)展,或能力與發(fā)展的個性化(the individuality of power and development),這需要自由和環(huán)境的差異化。密爾說這種論點人們實際上是接受的,“當(dāng)一個人各項能力已臻成熟,以他自己的方式利用和解釋經(jīng)驗,乃是人之為人的特權(quán)與固有條件(it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way)?!薄?8】無抉擇地盲從習(xí)俗“不能使他作為人類天賦異稟的任何屬性得到培育和發(fā)展。人類的諸種能力,如感知、判斷、識別、心智活動以及道德傾向等等,只有在有所抉擇時才能運用?!薄?8】“真正重要的,不僅是人們所行何事,而且還應(yīng)包括如此行事者是何等樣之人。在人類正確運用人生以求完善和美化的各種功業(yè)中,最重要的無疑還是人自己。(It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself)?!薄?9,這里極為類似Kant關(guān)于“人是自律的”的倫理學(xué)觀點】密爾還說,“人性并不是一部…機器,人性毋寧像是一棵樹(Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree),需要朝各個方向去成長與發(fā)展,并且是根據(jù)使它成為一個活體生命的內(nèi)在力量的傾向去成長和發(fā)展。”【69,這里又是Aristotle-Hegel式樣的有機體人性觀】
在上述康德自律式和Aristotle有機體混合人性觀之上,密爾認(rèn)為:不僅自我理解比盲目服從好,而且欲望與激情(desires and impulse)也應(yīng)該出于自己。激情無害,“人之為惡,并非激情如火之故,而是因為良心孱弱?!薄?0】成熟時代的缺陷恰好是個性不足而不是桀驁不馴。這里密爾采納了羅馬的自然人性論而不是基督教的禁欲論。密爾抨擊了加爾文主義對罪性的強調(diào),認(rèn)為“神賦予人的一切能力都該得到培育和發(fā)展?!惤掏降淖晕疑鞆垺c‘基督徒的自我克制’,同為人類的可貴之源?!薄?3】做Pericles好過做Knox和Alcibiades。“隨著個性的張揚,每個人變得對他自己更有價值,也因此就能更有益于他人。”【74】因此,需要個性自由,“無論哪個時代,個性自由得以發(fā)揮的程度是否寬廣,都是后世對其艷羨或鄙棄的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity)。…凡是摧毀人之個性的,卻都可以稱之為暴政?!薄?4】“在人類事務(wù)的極限之內(nèi),既然個性的舒展可以讓人類自身接近其所能達到的最佳境地?!薄?5】
另一個支持個性自由的理由是:人類個性和首創(chuàng)性的先進者的自由對那些不渴望自由的后進者也是有益處的。天才總是少數(shù),更具有個性,應(yīng)該予以寬容或擁有自由。人們雖然理論上贊同這點,但實際上卻漠不關(guān)心,而且“遍及世界的普遍趨勢仍然是使庸眾成為人世間的支配力量。…如今個人卻消失在人群之中了?!薄?7】庸眾的政府逃不了平庸的命運,在這種情形下,“非但不應(yīng)阻止,而且還應(yīng)鼓勵特立獨行之士故意做出異于群眾的行動?!薄?8-9】不茍先例本身就是一種貢獻。普通人的英明與光榮就在于追隨天才的創(chuàng)造,“能夠衷心響應(yīng)那些睿智高貴之事,并且不顧一切毅然相從…他(天才)所能要求的,只是為人們指出道路的自由而已?!薄?8】這里密爾再度采納了康德式的自律理由:獨立特行是好的,“以自己的方式籌劃生活,就是最好的,并非因為這種方式本身就為最好,而是因為這是屬于他自己的方式(his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode)?!薄?9】人與人之間差異極大,因此需要多樣化的環(huán)境和生活?!安煌娜诵枰煌臈l件以成就其精神發(fā)展;在一種相同的道德氛圍和風(fēng)氣之下,人們不可能健康地生活,這正如所有各種各樣的植物不可能在具有相同空氣和氣候的自然環(huán)境下健康地生存一樣?!薄?0,回到了Aristotle式的有機體理論】
以下是我對他在論自由里主要哲學(xué)假設(shè)的概括 (頁碼來源On Liberty & Utilitarianism, Pocket Edition):
Mill starts his defense of liberty by providing a formulation of his fundamental principles regarding liberty. He asserts that the sole purpose for which people can interfere with the liberties of others is self-protection. In other words, if a person does no harm to others, his or her individual liberty should be protected by the society (p.9). A person’s freedom of action or expression should be limited only if it actually violates or threatens an impending violation of the rights of the others (p.12). For instance, people can express their opinions that a corn-dealer is starving the poor, but may not instigate an excited mob to attack his house (p.55), because this action violates that basic principle of liberty.
Another important assumption underlying Mill’s arguments is that no one with human faculties can posses a claim to absolute truth. Even if something may seem like a “truth”, it only stays true so long as other people have not refuted it. Mill contends that we should allow others the liberty to contradict our opinions. He regards it as necessary if we want to assume our opinions to be true for the purpose of action (p.18). Those who oppress their opponents are essentially assuming themselves to be infallible. In addition, he argues that even if our opponents are wrong, we can still benefit from allowing them to express their own thoughts. After all, the conception and impression of truth will become clearer and more vivid by its “collision” with error (p.16). Here, Mill is also assuming that we, as humans, can best learn about our own opinions by listening to others. If we do not allow our opinions or customs to be challenged by others, even a “truth” will become a dogma and cease to suggest ideas. Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, all the finer essence of the “truth” will be lost in the long run (p.37).
Moreover, Mill argues not only for Liberty, but also for individuality and its development. In fact, he grounds his defense of individuality and its development on his conception of human nature. He believes that human nature is not a machine to be built after a model and to do the exact work prescribed for it by others. Instead, it should be a tree that grows and develops itself on all sides, according to the tendency of inward force that make it a living thing (p.59). Similar to Aristotle, Mill contends that human beings can exercise their human faculties only by making a choice. If people cannot follow their own plans for life, they can make no choice and thus gain no practice in discerning what is best. Consequently, they would have no need of their human faculties other than the ape-like one of imitation (p.58). Mill believes that if a person possesses enough amount of common sense and experience, his or her own way of living is the best, because it is his or her own mode. In other words, people should be allowed to develop their own individualities in their own ways, without hindrance from others (p.67).
In addition, Mill assumes that it is not denied by anyone that originality is desirable. There is a constant need of people to discover new truth, commence new practices and set new standards of more enlightened conduct, in order that the progress of human life would not become stagnant (p.64). Mill thus insists that it is crucial for the society to give the creative and original people a free soil in which they can grow without obstructions. For Mill, the chief danger of his time was the situation where few dared to become geniuses and be “eccentric” (p.67). To put it differently, it was the push towards collective mediocrity in his society that worried Mill.
Not only originality is a crucial component of individuality, energies, or strong desires, are also important. Unlike Plato, Mill believes that strong desires do not necessarily corrupt wills. In fact, he argues that it is not because men’s desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their wills are weak or inactive (p.59). In Mill’s conception, there is no natural connection between strong desires and a weak conscience. A person who possesses stronger desires may be capable of doing more harm but he or she is also able to do greater good (p.60). Consequently, Mill contends that one should not be afraid to lead more energetic life. Through originality and strong desires, one may develop one’s individuality towards the fullest.
我想問下”should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. “ 的by怎么理解?
引: 這位譯者批評許的翻譯的不好的地方,引了一段Mill的原文:They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally.
這位譯者把之翻譯成:“他們寧可在自己就是異見者的某一具體點上,盡力去改變?nèi)藗兊目捶?,而不愿?lián)合所有異見者同心協(xié)力來捍衛(wèi)自由?!边@位明顯是翻譯錯了,許的翻譯才是正確的:“他們寧愿就著他們自己持有異說的某些特定之點努力去改變?nèi)祟惖母邢?,而不把保衛(wèi)自由、保障一切異端作為一般性的主張?!倍疫@個句子的意思也差得特別遠。Mill的意思是要確定某種general principle, 而這位譯者居然是說要聯(lián)合heretics, 倒像是政治斗爭了。同心協(xié)力這個詞我更是不知道從哪里加進來的。 —————————————————————— 這句話兩位譯者譯得意思都對。爭議點在于“with heretics generally”看做動詞“make common cause”的修飾語,還是 “in defense of freedom”的并列結(jié)構(gòu)。若是前者,則是與所有異見者一道展開保護自由的共同事業(yè),那位糾錯者把make common cause譯為“同心協(xié)力”,把defense做了句中動詞,也通;而許先生的譯文則理解為“在保護自由和保護一般異見者”上make common cause(做出“一般性主張”),也通。不過準(zhǔn)確而言,若是徐先生的譯法,英文應(yīng)寫作:in defence of freedom and heretics generally(在一般性地保護自由和異見者上)。 第二句我沒有上下文,感覺不好判斷,我也讀過徐先生的譯本,感覺就是忠實、啰唆,偶有小錯。那位新譯者的譯文,從上面兩句來看,擁有簡練忠實和符合現(xiàn)代漢語的特點,倒反而是值得期待的。
我真沒明白make common cause怎么能翻譯成“同心協(xié)力”的。
你如果愿意的話,把第二句的出處告訴我一下。不過密爾的英文大多故意搞得非常復(fù)雜,他本人有沒有寫錯,我們是很難看出來的。 make common cause 就是做出共同的舉動。漢譯把這個意思轉(zhuǎn)換為“保護自由”的修飾副詞。
http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html 這邊有原文:They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally.
第二句在網(wǎng)上復(fù)制粘貼隨便一搜就有很多啊...
第二句在此:http://www.bartleby.com/130/2.html The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognisant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers—knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter—he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process. 7 It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public.
我粗看了一下,第二句的主干是:It is not too much to require … by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. (在混合少數(shù)智者和多數(shù)愚人的公眾那里,這有點要求并不過分) 什么要求呢? what the wisest of mankind, … , should be submitted to. (連人類中最智慧者都要屈從的東西) 哪些人類中最智慧者?those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it (那些最有權(quán)利相信自己的判斷、看到有必要確保他們仰賴其判斷的人)
“by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public” 更準(zhǔn)確地來說,應(yīng)該看成是從句里的縮略語:what the wises of mankind should be submitted to, (should also be submitted to) by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. 不知道這樣是不是更好?
@Nichts 但是這樣第一個從句就不怎么通:what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to. 這個里面的it該作何解? 不過我說的是不對,這句話可能是很復(fù)雜,我自己再想想。
@Nichts make common cause with是固定搭配,那么應(yīng)該是我弄錯了,多謝批評!我收回我帖子里的批評。
@SWX it好像是代指their own judgment. 看了Nichts拆的句子才發(fā)現(xiàn)自己果然也理解錯了。/掩面
句子分析:It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. 前面做完分析后發(fā)現(xiàn) “by …"應(yīng)看成從句內(nèi)部分。 主句:It is not too much to require that …(這要求并不過分) 從句1:what … should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public (那個what應(yīng)該被混合少數(shù)智者和多數(shù)愚人的公眾所遵循) 從句2: what the wisest of mankind, …, find necessary to warrant their relying on it (人類中最智慧者也認(rèn)為這個東西在保證他們倚賴自己的判斷上是必要的) 從句3 什么樣的最智慧者? the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment (那些最有資格信賴自己判斷的人類中最智慧者)
同意樓上。 另:樓主引用的批評許譯的第一個例子,我認(rèn)為批評者譯得是對的,尤其是前半句非常精確:“他們寧可在自己就是異見者的某一具體點上,盡力去改變?nèi)藗兊目捶ā?,后半句“make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally”——倘若覺得“同心協(xié)力”太滑溜了,不妨譯作“和持有異議者一起把捍衛(wèi)自由當(dāng)做共同的事業(yè)”。
xxx make common cause with yyy 就是xxx和yyy為了達到某個雙方都想要的目的而work together